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Abstract:  
 
Hiding operations from tax collectors increases information asymmetries between borrowers 
and lenders and ultimately reduces firms' access to finance. However, credit-constrained 
entrepreneurs can still fund investment by paying it out of their own savings. This paper 
studies these implications of borrowing constraints characterizing the informal sector for 
macroeconomic volatility. To this end, the author develops a simple dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model featuring tax avoidance and evasion opportunities. In the model, 
registered production not only is the basis to determine tax liabilities, but also serves as 
collateral for securing debts. Such a framework allows for endogenization of the extent of 
undeclared activity, and for analyzing the effect of informality on aggregate fluctuations 
through computational experiments. These experiments show that the borrowing-constrained 
informal sector exerts a non-negligible influence on the cyclical volatility of consumption 
and investment. Some qualifications and extensions conclude this work. 
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1  Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the implications for macroeconomic volatility of credit constraints 
characterizing the informal economy. It has been well documented that firms in such an 
economy typically under-report their operations and do not resort to formal capital markets 
(Straub, 2005). While this modus operandi enables them to hide their activities from tax 
collectors, it also reflects information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders that 
reduce incentives for financiers to loan. This argument is formalized here through a simple 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring several attributes observed in 
corporate income tax structures and debt enforcement procedures around the world. In such 
a framework, the extent of unrecorded production is endogenized allowing for computational 
experiments to analyze how the extent of undeclared activity and its determinants affect the 
cyclical volatility of macroeconomic aggregates like consumption and investment. 
 
Firms engaged in the informal sector must trade off the potentially larger profits from lack 
of transparency with the higher risk of detection and the lower access to credit that the 
concealment decision entails. While their incentives to operate informally are shaped by the 
possibility of reducing or eliminating tax liabilities and avoiding presumably burdensome 
regulations, being outside the government’s purview also means they may not have access to 
markets for external finance and formal contract enforcement mechanisms. Banks and other 
financial institutions are generally unwilling to grant credit to enterprises that lack proper 
documentation. Moreover, if to evade taxes companies do not officially declare all assets, 
their ability to use them as collateral for loans is limited. Their financial statements, further, 
may not provide an accurate representation of their financial soundness and economic 
prospects, thereby reducing their attractiveness to potential lenders.[1] 
 
These observations have recently found support in a number of theoretical and empirical 
studies focusing on the relation between access to credit and the extent of the shadow 
economy. Ellul et al. (2012) argue that the trade-off between the funding benefits and the tax 
costs of accounting transparency varies considerably across firms and countries depending 
on the corporate tax rate, the degree of tax enforcement and on a company’s need for external 
finance. Furthermore, Gatti and Honorati (2008) and Dabla-Norris and Koeda (2008) find 
evidence that higher tax evasion is significantly and robustly associated with lower access to 
formal credit, with a higher reliance on informal sources of financing (e.g. family, friends 
and money lenders), and with firms’ propensity to report availability of finance as an obstacle 
to their operations. Such findings are certainly in line with Capasso and Japelli (2013) and 
Bose et al. (2012), who show that financial and banking development play an important role 
in reducing the size of shadow economic activities. 
 
 
                                                 
[1] Conversely, it is likely that the same information that is used to signal creditworthiness to financial 
institutions make firms operations easier to monitor for tax purposes (see Gordon & Li, 2009). 
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One criticism that can be raised on these studies is that they tend to ignore the possibility of 
self-financing. In contrast to this view, the literature dealing with general-equilibrium models 
of heterogeneous agents that are subject to borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic 
productivity shocks posits that credit-constrained firms can accumulate internal funds to 
substitute for the lack of external finance. Moll (2014), in this regard, underscores productive 
entrepreneurs that cannot acquire capital in the market may still self-finance investment in 
the sense of paying it out of their own savings. Furthermore, Covas (2006) shows that the 
interaction of uninsurable production risks and financial frictions induces in poorly 
diversified entrepreneurs a strong precautionary savings motive that in turn leads to capital 
over-accumulation. 
 
While the existing literature on the macroeconomic implications of financial restrictions 
characterizing the unofficial economy focuses on growth and development (see, e.g., La 
Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Dabla-Norris and Feltenstein, 2005), very few studies have 
addressed the consequences on short-run aggregate fluctuations. Restrepo-Echavarria (2014) 
documents a systematically high correlation between the relative volatility of cyclical 
consumption to output and the extent of the unrecorded sector. Furthermore, Ferreira-Tiryaki 
(2008) and Granda-Carvajal (2010) present evidence suggesting that countries with a 
sizeable shadow economy tend to undergo increased volatility of output, investment and 
consumption over the business cycle. This evidence is partially challenged by Finkelstein 
Shapiro (2015), who finds no significant relationship between informality and output 
volatility once it is controlled for other determinants of the variability of output. 
 
To explain these patterns of aggregate volatility, Finkelstein Shapiro (2015) shows that the 
root cause of changes in informal sector size matters for the relationship between informality 
and both long- and short-run macroeconomic performance. In addition, Restrepo-Echavarria 
(2014) argues that poor measurement of the informal sector complements other mechanisms 
proposed in the literature on emerging market economies to account for high consumption 
volatility. Mitra (2013) resorts to one of such mechanisms, a working capital constraint, to 
claim in favor of the seemingly counterfactual idea that informality lowers consumption 
volatility by offsetting the effect of financial development. Finally, Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008) 
conjectures that a large informal sector leads to higher volatility because firms therein are 
credit constrained and thus cannot smooth fluctuations in cash flows. Despite their focus on 
financial issues, none of the latter studies takes the role of firms’ potential self-financing into 
account. 
 
This paper addresses the implications for macroeconomic volatility of informal firms’ 
borrowing constraints using a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring 
tax evasion opportunities. The proposed approach has some similarity to Jermann and 
Quadrini (2012), in that firms prefer debt over equity due to its tax advantage. In the model, 
registered activity not only is subject to taxation, but also can be used to signal 
creditworthiness to potential lenders. Hence tax evasion has two countervailing effects on 
firms’ access to finance: On the one hand, it worsens the terms and conditions of loan 
contracts by reducing the collateral that can be offered for securing debts. On the other hand, 
the concealed liabilities enable investment financing by raising internal sources of funds. 
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While the former effect lowers the amount of credit provided and causes aggregate volatility 
to rise, the latter one leads to a fall in the relative variability of consumption and investment. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model in detail. Then, the model 
is calibrated in the third section. Section 4 displays the results of computational experiments 
allowing for variations in the determinants of the extent of undeclared production, among 
other relevant parameters. These experiments support the prevalence of a self-financing 
channel, so that credit constraints in the informal sector exert a volatility-lowering influence 
on aggregate fluctuations. The last section concludes by highlighting some possible 
extensions and qualifications. 
 
2  The model 
 
This section develops a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with credit 
constraints and tax evasion opportunities. The model is similar to the one of Jermann and 
Quadrini (2012) in that the tax structure matters for the relevance of the borrowing constraint. 
Such a feature is aimed to bring the financially-constrained informal sector into the picture 
while conveying a likely representation of tax policy as observed in both developed and 
developing countries (see Gordon and Li, 2009).  
 
The economy is populated by the government, a large number of identical firms, and a large 
number of identical households, all of whom are infinitely lived. The government enforces a 
monitoring system for tax evasion and uses revenue to finance a stream of non-productive 
services. Firms maximize discounted profits contingent on the possibility of being discovered 
operating informally. Furthermore, they are allowed to claim the interest paid on borrowed 
funds as deductible from their taxable income. They finance capital investment through 
borrowing, but the value of their debt cannot exceed the amount of official earnings. Hence 
registered cash flows not only are subject to taxation, but also ensure lenders that debts will 
be fully secured. These features overall induce a variety of trade-offs in the choice of tax 
evasion that are at the heart of the model’s predictions. 
 
2.1  Households 
 
Households derive utility from consumption tc . They rent labor tl  and lend 
H
tb  to firms at a 
wage tw  and the agreed net interest rate tr . Furthermore, they earn real dividend income td  
and receive a lump-sum transfer tT  from the government. 
 
Assuming logarithmic utility and inelastic labor supply (i.e. 1=tl ), the representative 
household’s problem is given by  
 )(logmax
0=
0
1,
t
t
t
H
tbtc
cE 


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 subject to 
t
H
ttttt
H
tt Tbrlwdbc   )(1=1   
and the Euler equation for loans is:  
 ).(1
1
=
1
1
1








t
t
t
t
r
c
E
c
  (1) 
 
2.2  Firms 
Competitive firms in this economy purchase labor services and borrow from households to 
produce a homogeneous good ty . Technology is specified as follows:  
 ,= 1  tttt lkAy  (2) 
 
where tA  is a total factor productivity shock (expressed in logarithms) following the 
autoregressive process  
 ).(0,,= 21  NIIDeeAA tttt   (3) 
 
Consistent with the typical timing convention, capital is chosen at time 1t  and 
predetermined at time t . It evolves according to the law of motion ttt kik )(1=1  , where 
ti  is investment and   is the depreciation rate. 
  
Firms are assessed a tax on their corporate income at a fixed rate  . However, they are 
allowed to deduct the interest paid on borrowed funds from calculation of their tax base as 
given by the expression F
ttttt brlwy  . Such a tax advantage, as shown below, generates a 
preference for debt financing that induces entrepreneurs to leverage up. 
  
In addition to tax avoidance opportunities, the representative firm chooses to hide a fraction 
[0,1]t  of its activities in order to escape the tax and regulatory burden. Yet it faces the 
prospect of getting caught and forced to pay the entirety of its tax obligations with an 
endogenous probability tt  )(=),( , where  represents the monitoring effort of the 
revenue collection agency such that 0= 






d
d
. This detection probability is linear in t  
to convey the idea that having murky accounts, given a firm’s scale, induces the authorities 
to classify the concerned activities as suspicious.    
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Upon finishing production, the representative firm pays its wage bill ttlw  and last period loan 
payment F
tt br )(1 . Then it signs a new loan contract. It is assumed that, in case of default, 
a bankruptcy procedure liquidating the firm takes place such that a fraction (0,1)  of the 
expected value of next period registered production can be repossessed by lenders. Tax is 
senior to this recovery process. Thus, the firm faces the following collateral constraint:  
 
 ].)(1)1[( 11   ttt
F
t yEb   (4) 
 
Of the other part, creditors must incur the remaining proportion of the liquidation value 
1)(1)1()(1  ttt yE   as a transaction cost. The collateral constraint aims to convey the 
idea that lenders can only seize those assets that have been officially declared by the firm in 
the face of default. Note that the collateral share serves as a proxy for the quality of the 
financial system and of institutions. This is in line with Djankov et al. (2008), who find that 
the efficiency of debt enforcement procedures is strongly correlated with legal origins and 
credit market development. 
 
Furthermore, the amount firms are allowed to borrow is decreasing in their degree of tax non-
compliance, t . This is consistent with the assumption of ‘book-tax conformity’, which in 
the present setting means that the representative firm cannot report different earnings to both 
tax authorities and lenders. This assumption suggests that increasing tax evasion has two 
countervailing implications for firms’ access to finance: On the one hand, it reduces the 
collateral that can be offered for securing debts, and thus worsens the terms and conditions 
of loan contracts. On the other hand, the successfully concealed income ttt y )(1  enables 
them to raise internal sources of funds.    
 
Given these circumstances, the representative firm’s cash flow is given by  
 
 ,)(1)()(1= 1 ttt
F
t
F
tt
F
ttttt ybbibrwy     (5) 
 
which can be decomposed into after-tax dividends   
   FtFttFtttttt bbibrwyd  1)(1)(1=   (6) 
 
and unreported profits ttt y )(1 . Such profits are not redistributed to households but 
plowed back into the firm as inside funding. Along with Equation (4), Equation (5) implies 
that the tax gains obtained via greater evasion reduce the cash flow earnings that the firm can 
pledge to external investors. 
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The representative firm maximizes discounted profits with the stochastic discount factor of 
the household, 






1t
t
tt
c
c
E . Thus, the firm’s problem is  
 ,max
0=
0
1,1,
tt
t
F
tbtktl
E 


 
 subject to (5) and (4).  
   
Letting t  denote the time- t  Lagrange multiplier associated to the borrowing constraint, 
firms’ behavior is characterized by the Euler equations:  
 1=])(1[
1


tttttt yEy 


 (7) 
   tttttt rE    11 )(11=  (8) 
   ,)1()1)(1(])1(1[= 1
1
111 
  

 ttttttttttt kAE  (9) 
 
and by the first-order condition determining labor demand  
 .)(1)1(
1
1= 


ttttt kAw 








  (10) 
 
Equation (7) states that the firm evades to the point where the marginal tax savings equal the 
expected value of foregone borrowing opportunities. In other words, firms choose their 
degree of non-compliance to lower their burden of taxation; but, in doing so, they expose 
themselves to a higher cost of credit, and thereby to a reduction in the volume of loans and 
subsequent investment. This equation thus underlines the trade-off involved in a firm’s 
decision to conceal (or disclose) the proceeds from its activities as well as its countervailing 
implications for access to finance.  
 
Furthermore, Equation (8) relates the marginal benefit of borrowing to its marginal cost. 
Also, Equation (9) shows that the opportunity cost of withholding one unit of capital equals 
the expected discounted marginal product of capital. Note that borrowers internalize the 
effects of their capital stock in their financial constraints, so that the marginal benefit of 
withholding one capital unit is given not only by its marginal product but by the marginal 
benefit of being able to borrow more. 
 
Finally, note that firms internalize the corporate income tax structure and their compliance 
behavior in their loan and factor demands. The latter can be clearly seen in Equations (9) and 
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(10), which show that tax evasion supplements the marginal products of capital and labor. 
As for the former, deductibility of interest payments proves to be the main incentive for 
borrowing. 
 
2.3  Government 
 
The government produces unproductive services and makes transfer payments each period 
by collecting taxes on corporate income. Government consumption is assumed to follow a 
stochastic process given by  
 ,= ttt yGg  (11) 
 
where tG  is a random variable. As the government does not issue any debt, the flow budget 
constraint is  
   ttttttFttttttt yyEbrwyTg   1)1()(1=  (12) 
 
every period. Note that the tax avoidance opportunities associated to firms deducting interest 
payments on their debts lead to a government revenue loss that in the public finance literature 
is known as tax expenditures. 
 
Equation (11) can be alternatively expressed as  
 
 ,)(1)1()(= 1 tttttt
F
tttttt yyEbrwyTg     (13) 
 
where the third term on the right hand side reflects the amount of taxes on informal activities 
that go undetected. Since firms manage to dodge these liabilities, they are subtracted from 
what otherwise would be total tax revenue. In this regard, this term accounts for the so-called 
tax gap, that is, the difference between the amount of tax legally owed and the amount 
actually collected by the government. 
 
2.4  Equilibrium 
 
A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of a sequence of prices  
0=
,
ttt
rw ; a list 
of consumption plans and debt positions for households   0=1, tHtt bc ; a list of production and 
evasion plans and debt positions for firms   0=11,,, tFttdtt bkl , and the policy function tg  such 
that:  
 
 households maximize utility,  
 firms maximize profits,  
Borradores Departamento de Economía no. 54 
 
 
9 
 
 
 the government balances its budget,  
 individual and aggregate decisions are consistent, i.e. tt Kk  , and  
 markets for goods, labor and loans clear. 
 
Note that the market clearing conditions imply that each agent’s decision rules satisfy the 
resource constraint: 
 .])1(1[= tttttt ygic   (14) 
 
Also, equilibrium in the loans market means that borrowing must equal savings every period, 
that is,  
 .Ft
H
t bb   (15) 
 
Lastly, demand for labor by firms is equal to labor supply by households 
 .1dtl  (16) 
 
In addition to the above, the equilibrium share of output that firms leave ‘off the books’ is 
characterized in the following: 
Proposition 1 The fraction of output that the representative firm keeps unrecorded at the 
steady state is given by  
,
)(2
)1)(1(1




ss  
where it follows that 0



ss , 0



ss , and 0



ss .   
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Proposition 1 implies that the extent of unreported activities depends positively on the tax 
burden, and is negatively related to the level of enforcement and financial development. 
These connections have been extensively confirmed in the literature on informality and the 
shadow economy. While the former two relations have been claimed to be among the main 
features of the informal sector (see Ihrig & Moe, 2004), recent studies have shed light on the 
different channels involved in the link between financial depth and tax evasion (see, among 
others, Capasso & Jappelli, 2013; Ellul et al., 2012; Dabla-Norris & Koeda, 2008). 
 
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, the following proposition states the 
conditions for a binding borrowing constraint. 
 
Proposition 2 At steady state, the borrowing constraint holds with equality if 0> . 
Proof. See Appendix A.  
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Note that Proposition 2 can be formally proven only for the steady state. Therefore, the 
collateral constraint is binding as long as interest payments are deductible from corporate 
earnings, a feature of the tax structure that induces entrepreneurs to raise funds through debt 
financing. This feature indeed conveys a likely representation of tax policy, and thus is 
consistent with plausible parameterizations of the model. 
 
 
3  Calibration 
 
The system of equations used to compute the dynamic equilibria of the model depends on a 
set of twelve parameters. Of these, eleven can be obtained by resorting to related studies: the 
subjective discount factor (  ), the capital income share ( ), the depreciation rate ( ), the 
degree of financial development ( ), the corporate income tax rate (), the steady-state share 
of activity left ‘off the books’ ( ss ), and the parameters pertaining to the properties of shocks 
(the autocorrelation coefficients and the standard deviations). 
 
To begin, the values for the technology and preference parameters are common in the 
business cycle literature. Since the time period is set to one year, the values of the discount 
factor and the depreciation rate are 0.95 and 0.1. The capital income share also is set at 0.36. 
As for the borrowing constraint, the World Bank’s Doing Business project reports that the 
liquidation cost for an average firm in the U.S. has been about 7% of estate since 2006. 
Subtracting this value from the unity leads to the collateral share used here. 
 
The parameter value pertaining to taxation, 0.4136= , is obtained from the OECD Tax 
Database (2012). Specifically, it averages out a series of the combined federal and state 
statutory corporate income tax rate covering the period 1981-2012. The steady-state share of 
activity hidden from the revenue authority is taken from Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro 
(2010), who use the dynamic multiple input multiple indicator approach to provide an 
estimate of the size of the shadow economy of about 8.6% of GDP during 1999-2007.  
 
Moving on to the enforcement parameter, the endogenous detection probability is assumed 
to take the form tt  )( , so that  is linear in . This functional form facilitates 
computing the steady-state probability of detection by making use of the relation stated in 
Proposition 1 and the parameter values above. Thus, the probability 0.4864=ss  is obtained 
such that  approximates 5.6554. This probability is a bit higher than the one backed out by 
Prado (2011) for the U.S., but it still lies within the same author’s estimates for OECD 
countries. 
 
Finally, the value of the autocorrelation coefficient for the productivity shock is 40.95= . 
This value comes from adjusting the common coefficient used to match quarterly fluctuations 
to take account of annual frequencies. A similar criterion is followed to choose the standard 
deviation of the innovation, as it is set to the conventional 0.007. Likewise, the steady-state 
share of government expenditures in total output is estimated by averaging out the ratio of 
government consumption expenditures to GDP during 1970-2011. Further, the values 
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characterizing the distributional properties of government expenditure shocks are taken from 
Braun (1994). All the parameter values mentioned above are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
 
Table 1: Model parameters 
          ss  ss  
0.95 0.36 0.10 0.414 0.93 0.486 0.086 
 
 
Table 2: Parameter values for structure of shocks 
 Parameter  Description Value Source 
ssG   Steady-state share of government expenditure in output 0.190  BEA, 1960-2006 
   Persistence of productivity shocks 0.814  DSGE literature 
g   Persistence of government expenditure shocks 0.702  Braun (1994) 
   Standard deviation of productivity shocks 0.007  DSGE literature 
g   Standard deviation of government expenditure shocks 0.036  Braun (1994) 
 
 
4  Results 
 
The following experiments consider the implications for macroeconomic volatility of 
variations in key parameters of the model. It is worth noting that the main purpose of these 
experiments is not to determine whether the model can capture particular stylized facts about 
the U.S. economy, but to make a specific point through a series of numerical simulations. 
Overall, the results confirm the underlying intuition explained in previous sections and reveal 
some suggestive connections. 
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Note that the time series generated in the simulations are logged and detrended using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 100. Throughout the policy 
experiments and sensitivity exercises, the relative standard deviation –that is, the ratio of the 
standard deviation of the variable in question to the standard deviation of output– quantifies 
the volatility of investment and consumption. 
 
4.1  Policy experiments 
 
In this section, the results of experiments pertaining to policy variables such as the tax 
structure and its enforcement are analyzed. Also, the effects of changes in the degree of 
financial development are considered. 
 
4.1.1  Corporate tax rate 
The first experiment considers changes in the tax structure. In this respect, Figure 1 shows a 
substantial increase in the relative standard deviations of consumption and investment as the 
corporate income tax rate is raised, thus suggesting that higher taxes lead to greater aggregate 
volatility. 
 
Intuitively, a higher burden of taxation reduces the expected return on investment and 
consumption while increasing their variance. This intuition is certainly reflected in the 
patterns of macroeconomic volatility seen above, even if the variability of output exhibits a 
tenuous rise. This latter pattern, nevertheless, seems to contradict the findings of Posch 
(2011), who claims taxes ultimately affect output volatility. 
 
Furthermore, a higher burden of taxation induces firms to hide a larger share of their revenues 
from both tax authorities and lenders, thereby restricting investment financing through 
borrowing. Tax seniority upon default compounds to this financial friction, making firms 
even more credit constrained as taxes are raised. All these responses, as a result, support 
lower and more volatile investment and consumption. 
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Figure 1: Corporate tax rate and macroeconomic volatility  
 
 
4.1.2  Tax enforcement 
As with increments in the corporate tax rate, macroeconomic volatility may increase when 
the exogenous enforcement parameter rises. Indeed, Figure 2 shows that investment exhibits 
slightly more fluctuations over the business cycle as  is allowed to vary between 1 and 10, 
and thus the monitoring effort is strengthened. These patterns of aggregate behavior take 
place while the steady-state fraction of unrecorded production decreases considerably.  
 
The rationale for these patterns of both aggregate volatility and tax evasion lies in the 
deterrent effect of greater enforcement, which induces firms to report a larger share of their 
activities and increase their expected tax payments.[2] Due to the endogenous character of the 
detection probability, such patterns stand in accordance with the previously described 
taxation results to various degrees. 
                                                 
[2] Given that its determinants are not being altered, the probability of detection remains constant at steady state. 
To see this, confront Proposition 1 and  ’s functional form. 
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Figure 2: Tax enforcement and macroeconomic volatility 
 
 
4.1.3  Financial development 
Credit constraints arise endogenously in the model because lenders cannot force borrowers 
to repay their debts unless these are secured by collateral. In such a context, the fraction of 
the pledgeable asset that is lost in debt enforcement is given by the extent and quality of the 
financial system. Thus, a high value of  indicates a lower liquidation cost, and hence a more 
developed financial sector, compared to a low , which points to inefficient enforcement 
procedures inherent to underdeveloped credit markets. Furthermore, higher financial 
development exerts a detrimental influence on the degree of tax non-compliance as stated in 
Proposition 1. 
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Figure 3: Financial development and macroeconomic volatility 
 
The existing literature dealing with financial markets has shown that credit frictions may be 
a powerful transmission mechanism that propagates and amplifies shocks. However, the 
patterns of aggregate volatility displayed in Figure 3 convey a mixed picture. On the one 
hand, consumption remains roughly as volatile. On the other hand, the relative standard 
deviation of investment slightly decreases as financial development rises and thus 
inefficiencies in the liquidation of the collateralized asset become smaller. In this case, as 
Mendicino (2012) claims, credit frictions limiting the amount of borrowing to a small fraction 
of the liquidation value of capital makes the amplification generated by the collateral 
constraint significant, even under standard assumptions about the utility function and the 
production process. 
 
Complementary experiments (not shown here) suggest that these patterns of aggregate 
volatility hold at both high and low degrees of tax non-compliance. These results certainly 
contrast those found by Mitra (2013), who claims the informal sector weakens the working 
capital channel of financial development and thereby exerts a downward pressure on the 
variability of consumption. As can be inferred from the present study, distinct mechanisms 
are at the core of our discrepancies on the effect of credit market depth on macroeconomic 
volatility for different levels of informality. 
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4.2  Further experiments: An exogenous share of undeclared activity 
 
The experiments below allow one to examine a particular case of the model economy in 
which both the share of unreported production and the detection probability are taken as 
exogenous. Admittedly, the aim of these experiments is not to explain the emergence of an 
informal sector, but rather to analyze the consequences of such a sector’s inherent financial 
constraints for aggregate fluctuations assuming its existence as given. The resulting patterns 
also can be compared with those of related studies. 
 
Figure 4 shows how macroeconomic volatility behaves as the share of production that firms 
leave off the books is allowed to vary. Note that 0=  implies full compliance with the 
existing taxes and regulations, whereas 1=  denotes complete tax evasion. It can be seen 
that the relative standard deviation of investment declines in a small but non-negligible 
manner, while output and consumption variability remain approximately constant despite 
increases in the extent of unreported activity.  
 
While at odds with the literature, these patterns of macroeconomic volatility can be explained 
in terms of the mechanisms at work in the model. Specifically, tax evasion plays two 
conflicting roles in the economic environment: On the one hand, it tightens the borrowing 
constraint by rendering a fraction of output non-collateralizable, thus hindering investment 
and consumption smoothing (via dividends). On the other hand, the tax liabilities firms 
manage to conceal from the revenue collection authority constitute a form of savings that 
supports investment and thereby consumption smoothing. Though the former role causes 
aggregate variability to rise, tax savings counteract limited access to finance and lead to a fall 
in the relative volatility of consumption and investment.  
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Figure 4: Extent of informality and macroeconomic volatility 
 
The effect of evasion-induced savings can be best seen by comparing both the benchmark 
economy and the setting above with one in which diverted cash flow earnings are not plowed 
back into the firm as internal funding, thus comprising a private benefit to the entrepreneur. 
Since the amount firms are allowed to borrow is decreasing in their degree of informality, 
economies wherein less activity is reported to the tax authorities presumably exhibit tighter 
financial conditions. As limited access to external finance further magnifies the propagation 
of productivity shocks, consumption and investment are expected to be more volatile. 
 
In line with this conjecture, the relative volatility of consumption and investment increase 
monotonically with the extent of unrecorded activity.[3] These patterns of cyclical behavior 
are illustrated in Figure 5, which also shows that the standard deviation of output remains 
approximately constant despite variations in the extent of tax non-compliance. Thus, even 
though these results do not seem to fully confirm Ferreira-Tiryaki’s (2008) empirical 
analysis, they certainly support Finkelstein Shapiro’s (2015) and Restrepo-Echavarria’s 
(2014) findings regarding the relationship between informality and macroeconomic 
volatility. 
 
                                                 
[3] Numerical simulations using Dynare yield convergence problems after 0.6= . 
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Figure 5: Macroeconomic volatility when undeclared output is private gain 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that higher tax evasion contributes to increase internal sources of 
funds not only at the present time, but also in future periods. This effect is due to the 
constraints evasion impose on borrowing possibilities, as these prevent firms from incurring 
financial costs. Note, further, that such an effect of tax non-compliance offsets the cash flow 
effects attributable to tax avoidance by reducing after-tax profits, hence limiting the potential 
for additional savings via tax-deductible interest payments. 
 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
 
The present paper addresses the implications for macroeconomic volatility of borrowing 
constraints characterizing the informal sector. To this end, it develops a simple dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model featuring financial frictions and tax evasion 
opportunities. In the model, firms operating unofficially are subject to credit rationing, which 
reduces loans in relation to their non payment of taxes. This assumption is consistent with 
the observation that it may be more difficult for tax evaders to access external finance because 
doing so entails official documentation, especially if lenders require collateral and if the 
process of hiding economic activity involves concealing the true ownership of assets. After 
identifying the determinants of the extent of the unrecorded sector, some computational 
experiments allow one to examine how informality and its determinants affect aggregate 
volatility. 
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This paper contributes to better understand the trade-offs involved in the choice of tax 
evasion, as well as the implications of policies addressing this phenomenon for aggregate 
fluctuations. The proposed model, in particular, highlights two countervailing consequences 
of tax non-compliance for firms’ access to finance: On the one hand, it worsens the terms 
and conditions of loan contracts by reducing the collateral that can be offered for securing 
debts. On the other hand, the successfully dodged liabilities amount to a form of savings that 
raises internal funds. While the former lowers the amount of credit provided and thus causes 
macroeconomic volatility to rise, the latter counteracts lack of access to outside financing 
and leads to a fall in the relative variability of consumption and investment. 
 
As it stands, firms in the model face a binding borrowing constraint in equilibrium. This 
feature relies on the assumption that interest payments are deductible from taxable income, 
thereby incentivizing entrepreneurs to raise funds through debt financing. Two other 
important assumptions underlying the proposed mechanism are book-tax conformity and tax 
seniority in the event of default. A high degree of alignment between tax and financial 
reporting implies that the extent of transparency chosen by the representative firm affects not 
only its tax liabilities, but its debt capacity as well. Tax seniority, in turn, further toughens 
the financial friction. All these assumptions are aimed to convey a realistic characterization 
of tax policy and are at the heart of the results. 
  
Provided that the firm reinvests the proceeds of undeclared activity, the findings in this paper 
do not support the stylized facts reported by Finkelstein Shapiro (2015), which state that 
countries with a sizeable shadow economy exhibit higher volatilities of consumption and 
investment. Moreover, these findings contrast a variety of mechanisms suggested in business 
cycle studies dealing with labor informality (Restrepo-Echavarria, 2014; Mitra, 2013). To 
the extent that the model presented here addresses informality only at the firm level, 
comprehensive consideration of the characteristics and dimensions associated to the 
unofficial sector emerges as a potential improvement. In this regard, accounting for self-
financing as a substitute to lack of external funds through models with heterogeneous agents 
stands as a worthy path to pursue. 
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Appendices 
A  Proof of Proposition 2 
The first order condition of the household with respect to savings H
tb  is summarized by  
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At steady state, this condition reduces to  
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1
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
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Now, the first order condition of the firm with respect to borrowings F
tb  can be summarized 
by  
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At steady state, this condition reduces to  
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 Substituting (13) into (14), and taking into account that  =ss , one gets that  
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ss rr 


 
which, after some simplification, becomes  
 .=)(1 ss  (A.3) 
 Hence, a necessary condition for 0>ss  is that 0> . 
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B  Proof of Proposition 1 
The first order condition of the firm with respect to the fraction of output hidden from the tax 
authority t  is given by  
.=])(1[
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At steady state, this condition reduces to  
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Substituting condition (A.1) into (B.1), one gets that  
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which, after some algebraic manipulations, becomes  
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From Equation (B.2), it can be ascertained that  
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where property (B.5) comes from the detection probability characteristic that 0


d
d
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